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Is Cheap Talk Effective at Eliminating Hypothetical Bias in a Provision Point Mechanism?
Abstract
Significant difference between response to real and hypothetical valuation questions is often
referred to as hypothetical bias. Some economists have had success with using “cheap talk”
(which entails reading a script that explicitly highlights the hypothetical bias problem before
participants make any decisions) as a means of generating unbiased responses in a referendum
format. In this article, we test the robustness of cheap talk using a voluntary contribution
mechanism with a provision point over a wide range of possible payment amounts. Our results
confirm the existence of hypothetical bias, and suggest that cheap talk may eliminate
hypothetical bias, but only for respondents facing higher payments.

1. INTRODUCTION
There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the contingent valuation method (CVM) often
overstates real economic value. For example, in a review of the literature, Harrison and
Rutström 2002 find that 34 of 39 CVM estimates reviewed contained hypothetical bias with an
average bias of about 338 percent. These results are consistent with those in meta-analyses by
List and Gallet 2001, and Murphy, et al. 2003.
This problem has motivated research to develop techniques that either eliminate or adjust
for hypothetical bias. Of particular interest is the “cheap talk” CVM design recently employed
by Cummings and Taylor 1999 (hereafter C&T) wherein experimental subjects were read a
script describing the bias problem and were explicitly asked to not overstate their true
willingness to pay (WTP). C&T were successful in using the cheap talk design to eliminate
hypothetical bias in a referendum for three different public goods. However, the evidence about
cheap talk’s robustness is mixed. Cummings, et al. 1995 found that a shortened version of the
script actually worsens the bias, but a lengthier script similar to that in Cummings and Taylor
1999 was successful. Similarly, Poe, et al. 2002 tested a shortened version of the cheap talk
script in a voluntary contribution telephone survey and found that the short script had no effect.
Conversely, Aadland and Caplan 2003 find that a short cheap talk script was effective. List 2001
reports that a long script did not reduce hypothetical bias with experienced card dealers, but was
effective with inexperienced participants; both Lusk 2003, and Aadland and Caplan 2003 report
similar results. Brown, et al. 2003 found that the long cheap talk script was successful in a
referendum, but only for higher payment amounts.
The simplicity of cheap talk makes it an attractive approach to minimizing hypothetical
bias, however it is important to understand how it works in different contexts. Whereas C&T,
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and Brown, et al. 2003 use a referendum, this article tests the ability of cheap talk to elicit actual
values for a public good using a dichotomous choice format in a voluntary contribution
mechanism with a provision point (PPM). Although frequently used in CVM studies, voluntary
contribution mechanisms are often thought to be neither incentive compatible nor demand
revealing (Berrens, et al. 2002; Poe, et al. 2002). Consequently, a concern here is that voluntary
contribution mechanisms may exacerbate hypothetical bias because of free-riding associated
with actual contributions.
Although the voluntary contribution mechanism is not incentive compatible,
experimental evidence has consistently shown that pure free-riding occurs far less than predicted
by expected utility theory (see Ledyard 1995 for a summary of the literature). To reduce any
free-riding effects, we use a modified voluntary contribution mechanism that incorporates a oneshot provision point with a money-back guarantee if the provision point is not met (Rondeau, et
al. 1999). Benefits are extended if the provision point is exceeded. Isaac, et al. 1989; Rondeau,
et al. 1999; and Marks and Croson 1998 show that the PPM significantly increases voluntary
contributions. Rondeau, et al. 1999, and Rose, et al. 2002 observe approximately demand
revealing behavior with a provision point mechanism and that it is generally more efficient than
a simple VCM, with a few minor exceptions.
Voluntary contribution mechanisms are important because they are widely used and may
often be the only plausible way of financing some types of goods, such as local public goods
(Berrens, et al. 2002; Champ, et al. 1997). Moreover, theoretically incentive compatible
mechanisms, such as a referendum, are not without disadvantages. Even if a referendum were a
credible means of generating the revenue to provide the good, the NOAA panel recognizes that
the referendum itself is still hypothetical, and respondents may not believe that the payment
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vehicle (e.g., taxes, higher prices, etc.) will be implemented (Arrow, et al. 1993). In addition, the
NOAA panel notes that respondents may not expect their votes to influence the outcome.
Moreover, respondents may object to mandatory payments, possibly for selfish reasons or
because they do not wish to impose a cost on those who would not otherwise contribute
voluntarily (Champ, et al. 1997). Clearly, the researcher has no taxing authority, so compulsory
payments, if the referendum were to pass, are not only problematic for field studies, but can also
generate ill-will in laboratory settings with students who may be involuntarily forced to
relinquish money earned for participating. Perhaps most importantly, despite the theoretical
advantages of the referendum format in eliminating free-riding, empirical evidence suggests that
hypothetical bias persists (Cummings, et al. 1995; Cummings, et al. 1997; Taylor 1998; Brown,
et al. 2003), and the complexities involved in applying corrective mechanisms in the field are
often overwhelming (Rondeau, et al. 1999).
An issue particularly relevant to this paper is that cheap talk may only work well for higher
payment levels. C&T used only one payment level ($10), whereas Brown, et al. 2003 varied
payment amounts between $1 and $8. They found that for referenda cheap talk eliminated
hypothetical bias associated with $5 and $8 payments, but cheap talk had very little effect on
lower levels. However, their payment range, ($1-$8), is rather narrow and if cheap talk is to be
used in a dichotomous choice framework, it is important to determine its impact over a much
wider range of values, and in a voluntary contribution setting.
Consequently, in this article we test the robustness of the C&T cheap talk procedure for
eliminating hypothetical bias associated with provision of a local public good in a voluntary
contribution setting over a relatively wide range of dichotomous choice payments. Our results
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indicate that the cheap talk script as used by C&T appears to eliminate hypothetical bias, but
only for higher payment levels.

2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experimental design closely follows that of C&T and Brown, et al. 2003 with three
important differences: (1) we use a PPM whereas C&T and Brown, et al. employed a
referendum, (2) each subject was asked to respond to a randomly selected contribution level
between $3 and $30,1 and (3) we asked survey participants a series of follow-up questions that
explored the nature of their decision-making process and reaction to the cheap talk script. In
addition, our experiments were conducted in a computer lab, whereas the C&T experiments were
hand-run (we expect that this last difference should not affect the results significantly).
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of
Massachusetts and randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. There were multiple
sessions for each treatment and group size varied between 4 and 17; subjects were not told the
total number of experiment participants. The good used in this study was a voluntary
contribution to the Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy for the specific purpose of
placing signs in and around Mt. Toby (about 7 miles from the university) to mark trails as well as
rare and endangered species. To mitigate incentives for free-riding, a $500 provision point was
incorporated. Participants were told that their money would be refunded if $500 were not raised,
and that benefits would be extended if the provision point were exceeded. Participants were then
asked a dichotomous choice willingness to pay question with the amount asked varying
randomly between 3 and 30 dollars:2
“Are you willing to contribute $_____ to the Nature Conservancy so that signs can be placed in
and around Mt. Toby identifying the trails and rare species?”
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The computer replaced the blank in the above payment question with the appropriate dollar
amount and subjects were unaware of the amounts others were asked to pay. Participants were
also asked a series of demographic and follow-up questions. The follow-up questions were
designed to gather information about each participant's decision-making process. All questions
were presented sequentially, so respondents were unaware of the content of the upcoming
questions. Once a question was answered, respondents could not return to a question. The
survey, which was computerized, took approximately 20 minutes to complete, after which the
participants were paid a $10 show-up fee.
The 3x2 experimental design is shown in Table I; each cell contains the number of
observations for each treatment. To test for possible "found money" or "house money" effects,
the CVM-only and Auction+CVM treatments required different amounts of time and effort from
participants. Following C&T, the purpose of the auction was to get participants to work so that
they felt as though they earned the money they received for participating in the experiments, and
will therefore treat it as their own money. In the auction stage, subjects participated in the
buying and selling of a fictitious commodity in which they could earn money in addition to the
$10 show-up payment. This auction for a fictitious good had no relation to the good being
valued or the CVM survey, but it provided participants with an opportunity to earn slightly more
money (average auction earnings were about $1) for an additional 30 minutes in the lab. The
CVM-only participants only participated in the CVM computer survey.
<INSERT TABLE I>
The remaining treatment variable in Table I describes the type of survey environment
participants experienced: real payment, hypothetical payment, or hypothetical payment with
cheap talk.3 We will refer to these treatments as Real, Hypothetical and Cheap Talk,
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respectively. In each treatment, the good was described in the same way and the provision rule
was the same (the instructions are in Appendix A). The only difference among treatments was
whether contributions would be real or hypothetical, and whether the cheap talk script was read
to the participants in a hypothetical payment setting (see Appendix B for cheap talk script).
In the Hypothetical treatment, participants were told that they would not have to pay any
money, but that they should respond to the valuation question as though they would have to pay
today. Participants were asked the same dichotomous choice voluntary contribution willingness
to pay question in the Real treatment but, at the end of the session, they were required to actually
pay the amount they indicated they would be willing to contribute. For the Cheap Talk sessions,
participants were given the same survey as the participants in the Hypothetical treatment, except
there was an additional cheap talk script that was read to them by the experimenter before the
WTP question was posed. This cheap talk script was similar to that used by C&T with minor
wording changes to account for the provision point mechanism instead of a referendum format.
In a homegrown value study, such as this, it is impossible to know an individual’s true
preferences. Therefore, consistent with similar experimental valuation studies, we make the
assumption that payments in the Real treatment accurately reflect the true economic value for the
good. Recent work by List, et al. 2004 cast some doubt on the validity of this assumption. They
find that social isolation can have considerable influence on stated preferences, but that the
difference between real and hypothetical values is roughly constant across treatments. This
implies that although our response rates may be biased upwards, it should have no qualitative
effects on our conclusions.
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3. RESULTS
The basic results from our experiments are presented in Table II. Despite a pre-experiment
survey that indicated strong support for Nature Conservancy programs, in the Real treatment
there were only 2 “yes” responses. The unexpected result that the good appears to have
relatively little value provides us with the opportunity to test cheap talk in a much simpler
setting. In a typical valuation survey, the payment response can be divided into two decisions:
(1) do I value this good at all?, and (2) if so, how much am I willing to pay? This decision
sequence is sometimes estimated using a hurdle model. Opaluch and Segerson 1989 note that for
unfamiliar goods, individuals may not know precisely their WTP, but can place it within a range,
or ambivalence region. Hence, should the amount asked fall within this region, the person may
become more uncertain about her response. When payments are real, the respondent may invest
more cognitive effort to reduce the ambivalence region. This could lead to different responses in
real and hypothetical settings. The rationale behind the cheap talk script is to coax individuals to
invest this cognitive effort even though payment is hypothetical. In our experiment, subjects
typically earned $10-12 for about an hour of their time. For the higher payment amounts, above
$9, a “yes” response means that the subject would earn nothing and could possibly have to
contribute more than they earned. Given that real WTP approaches zero, for these individuals, it
is likely that these higher amounts asked lay outside the ambivalence region. Therefore, the
contribution decision in either the hypothetical or the cheap talk setting should have been
straightforward—the amount asked differs substantially from the goods value, so respond “no.”
<INSERT TABLE II>
However, this is not what we observe in Table II. Overall, the percentage of participants
giving a “yes” response to the dichotomous choice question in the Hypothetical treatment (32%)
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was much greater than in the Real treatment (3%). The cheap talk script appears to be effective
only at the higher payment levels. For $3 and $6 payments, however, cheap talk does not appear
to have achieved its goal—half the Cheap Talk participants responded “yes” as opposed to only
11% in the Real treatment.
These findings, as expected, strongly suggest the presence of hypothetical bias. Table III
presents the results of two logit models in which the binary contribution decision (1=”yes”
response to contribution question) is a function of the amount the subject was asked to pay, and
dummy variables for the Real and Cheap Talk treatments. The expanded model also includes a
dummy variable for the Auction+CVM treatment along with social-economic characteristics
similar to those in C&T.
In both models, the coefficient for Real is negative and highly significant confirming the
presence of hypothetical bias. The next issue to be examined is whether the C&T cheap talk
script was effective in eliminating this hypothetical bias. For both models, a test of the null
hypothesis that Real = Cheap Talk is rejected at the 5% level of significance indicating that the
probability of contributing in the Cheap Talk treatment is different from that in the Real
treatment when the entire range of dollar amounts is considered. In addition, since the
coefficient on Cheap Talk in the expanded model is not statistically significant, this model
suggests that cheap talk had no effect on hypothetical responses.
<INSERT TABLE III>
The five variables omitted in the condensed model were not jointly significant in the
expanded model (χ2 = 4.09, p-value=0.54). The rationale for the condensed model is that since
the amount asked varied across subjects, it is possible that controlling for bid level, rather than
the non-significant socio-economic variables, is driving the equivalence between the Cheap Talk
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and Hypothetical treatments in the expanded model. The primary results of the condensed model
are consistent with the expanded model: the coefficient on Real is significant, and a test of the
null hypothesis that Real = Cheap Talk is rejected at the 5% level. However, the Cheap Talk
coefficient is significant, indicating that the script had some effect in reducing the bias, but the
reduction was not sufficient to bring hypothetical payment responses in line with the real
payment responses.
The model in Table III also includes a dummy variable for whether the individual
participated in the auction. This coefficient is not statistically significant which suggests that
either there were no found money effects, or the found money effects were the same across both
the Auction+CVM and CVM only treatments. This is consistent with both Clark 2002 and List
2004 who find no evidence of found money effects in public goods experiments.
The logit results in Tables III indicate that when taken over all payment amounts, cheap
talk reduced the percentage of subjects giving “yes” responses relative to subjects in the
hypothetical situation without cheap talk, but did not bring these responses in line with the real
payment condition. Using the approach in Brown, et al. 2003, Table IV presents the results from
a series of Fisher’s exact p-value tests to determine whether the effectiveness of cheap talk is
sensitive to the payment amount. These tests make pairwise comparisons of the treatments while
holding the payment level constant. To ensure sufficient observations for a meaningful test, we
combined adjacent dollar amounts. When all dollar amounts are pooled, the results in Table IV
are consistent with the logit results—there is a statistically significant difference between the real
and cheap talk treatments. However, this conclusion is sensitive to the amount asked. Cheap
talk appears to be ineffective for payments of $3 or $6, but is able to align real and hypothetical
responses with higher dollar amounts. Thus, it appears that Brown, et al. 2003 result is robust
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across both referenda and PPM.4 It is worth noting that a recent meta analysis (Murphy, et al.
2003) reports median real and hypothetical CV values in similar experimental settings of $3.67
and $7.18, respectively. These values fall within the range where the effectiveness of cheap talk
may be limited in our study.
<INSERT TABLE IV>
The next issue to be addressed is why the cheap talk script was successful in eliminating
hypothetical bias for higher but not for lower payment levels. Brown, et al. suggests that some
respondents may have believed they would not vote against a referendum at low payment levels.
“That is, they may not have envisioned significant bias at that level, leaving them less
susceptible to the script.” However, interpreting our results is somewhat more complex because
there are well-known theoretical reasons why individuals may behave differently in a voluntary
contribution as compared to a referendum valuation format (Hoehn and Randall 1987). Taylor
1998 points out that if “the real-payment experiment is not demand revealing, then differences in
responses to hypothetical and real valuation questions could be due to free-riding in the realpayment scenario and not due to hypothetical bias in the hypothetical survey.” In fact, C&T note
that their evidence of hypothetical bias could actually be due to free-riding since their referenda
are not strictly closed. Taylor 1998 did conduct a subsequent closed referenda for one of the
goods and reported results similar to those found in the C&T open referendum. However, since
the voluntary contribution mechanism used in our study is not necessarily incentive compatible,
it is important to determine whether results of our real treatments were biased downward because
of free-riding.
To test for free-riding behavior, we asked each subject a series of follow-up questions.
Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the extent to which the following statement
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influenced their decision about how much to pay: “Since others will pay, I do not need to
contribute as much.” Subjects were also asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 the degree to
which they agreed with the statement that “most other people will contribute less than what (the
good) is really worth to them because they will be able to enjoy the benefits, regardless of how
much they contribute.” We also asked whether the respondent’s decision about how much to pay
depended on what they thought others would do, and whether they would change their payment
decision if they knew exactly what others had paid.
Table V summarizes the responses to these follow-up questions. Most respondents were
neutral with respect to the likelihood that others would free-ride, and report that free-riding had
very little influence on their own payment decision; a very small percentage of respondents said
that their decision about how much to pay depended on what they thought others would pay.
These results suggest that there is very little evidence of free-riding behavior in our experiments
and are consistent with the observations of Ethier, et al. 2000 and Rondeau, et al. 1999 that a
PPM can approximate actual demand in experimental settings. Even if free-riding behavior exists
in our subjects’ responses, the resulting free-rider bias in our WTP estimates would likely be the
same in all three treatments and any differences in WTP should be due to the hypothetical nature
of the valuation question.5 Consequently, we believe that the observed difference in responses to
our Real, Hypothetical, and Cheap Talk treatments is primarily due to hypothetical bias and not
free-riding.6
<INSERT TABLE V>
However, we are unable to completely eliminate the possibility that free-riding
contributed to the hypothetical bias observed in this study. Moreover, as noted by one reviewer,
some respondents may have felt that voluntary contributions are not a fair way to fund public
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goods. If concerns about fairness have a greater affect on real than on hypothetical responses,
then hypothetical bias in a voluntary contribution setting may be related to both free riding and
concern about fairness. Since the C&T cheap talk script does not attempt to address either of
these issues, cheap talk may not be as effective in a voluntary contribution setting relative to the
traditional referendum context.
On the other hand, subjects were also asked follow-up questions to determine whether
and how the cheap talk script may have influenced their responses. When asked whether cheap
talk influenced individual’s contribution decisions, about 56 percent of respondents reported that
they had reduced their payment in response to cheap talk. However, about 44 percent stated that
they had already carefully considered their contribution decision and that they were, therefore,
not affected by the cheap talk script.

4. CONCLUSIONS
Although additional testing of the cheap talk approach is clearly needed, the results reported here
suggest that the effectiveness of this method, at least in its present form, may be somewhat
limited. It is likely that a number of factors affect hypothetical bias and therefore no single
technique will be the “magic bullet” that eliminates this bias. Ultimately, mitigating hypothetical
bias will probably involve a combination of techniques, including both instrument and statistical
calibration. We also recognize that practical considerations, such as budget and time constraints,
may limit the ability of some CVM studies to implement more complex instruments (particularly
if laboratory experiments, such as those conducted by Fox, et al. 1998, are necessary for
calibration). For CVM studies conducted with limited resources, there may be an interest in
“short cuts” that are “reasonably” effective. Consistent with Brown, et al. 2003, our results
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suggest that cheap talk is effective in a PPM, but only at higher payment levels. The cheap talk
literature suggests that cheap talk’s effectiveness may be sensitive to script length, subject
experience with the good, and payment amounts. Therefore, further research is necessary to
develop a better understanding of underlying causes of hypothetical bias and how it is affected
by cheap talk. We conclude that cheap talk may have the potential to achieve its objective, but
the approach should be used with caution.
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See Table II for bid distribution across treatments.

2

For some students, the amount asked exceeded the amount earned in the experiment. In the instructions, we told
students “If you choose to contribute more than you have earned today, you will be expected to pay the difference
in cash or check at the end of today's session” (with minor wording changes for the hypothetical treatments). In
these cases, it is possible that some contributions may have been constrained by the amount of money the
students had with them. However, we doubt this was an issue since no one responded “yes” to a real payment
above $6.

3

In this article, we use the terms “real” and “actual” interchangeably. Contributions in the real payment treatment
may or may not be related to the actual Hicksian surplus measure that CVM attempts to estimate.

4

Our combined $9 and $12 amounts are comparable to C&T’s $10 amount asked. In the Hypothetical treatment,
24% of respondents responded “yes.” However, in both the Real and Cheap Talk treatments, we observe zero
“yes” responses which is consistent with C&T’s cheap talk result.

5

For each question in Table V, we used a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to make pairwise comparisons of
the distribution of responses across treatments. In all cases, the tests failed to reject the hypothesis of equal
distributions at any conventional level of significance.

6

It is also worth noting that many previous empirical studies find very little, if any, evidence of free-riding
behavior in actual CVM situations (Milon 1989).
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Table I
Experimental Design
Number of Observations per Treatment
Real

Cheap Talk

Hypothetical

Auction+CVM

30

31

30

CVM-only

31

37

30
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Table II
Distribution of responses by amount asked and treatment
Real

Hypothetical

Cheap Talk

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

1

7

9

1

5

5

$ 6

1

10

2

7

5

5

$ 9

0

10

2

6

0

12

$ 12

0

12

2

7

0

14

$ 15

0

10

2

5

1

5

$ 18

0

7

2

8

0

12

$ 21

0

1

0

4

0

1

$ 24

0

1

0

1

0

0

$ 27

0

0

0

1

0

1

$ 30

0

1

0

1

0

2

Amount
asked

Yes

$ 3
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Table III
Logit Models for Dichotomous Choice Valuation Question

Variable
Intercept
Amount Asked
Real
Cheap Talk
Participated in Auction+CVM
treatment
Number of subjects in group
Year of Birth
Gender = 1 if female
Monthly Disposable Income c

Expanded
Model a
Coefficient
(Std. error)
275.5
(208.7)
–0.25 ***
(0.06)
–3.24 ***
(0.91)
–0.89
(0.71)
–0.20
(0.51)
–0.04
(0.08)
–0.14
(0.11)
–0.30
(0.53)
0.22
(0.30)

Condensed
Model b
Coefficient
(Std. error)
1.66 ***
(0.57)
–0.24 ***
(0.05)
–3.06 ***
(0.81)
–1.15 **
(0.49)

Dependent variable is whether the individual contributed the amount asked (0=did not contribute, 1=did
contribute). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
a

N=176. Likelihood Ratio Test: χ2[8] = 52.00 (p=0.00). A test of the null hypotheses Real=Cheap Talk is
rejected at the 5% level of significance (χ2[1]=5.39, p=0.03).

b

N=189; Likelihood Ratio Test: χ2[3] = 50.70 (p=0.00). A test of the null hypotheses Real=Cheap Talk is
rejected at the 5% level of significance (χ2[1]=5.47, p=0.02).

c

Categorical variable (1=$0-300; 2=$301-400; 3=$401-500; 4=$501-600; 5=$601-800; 6=801-1000;
7=$1001-2000; 8=$2001-3000; 9=$3001-4000; 10=over $4000).
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Table IV
Test of equal proportions by treatment and amount asked
(Fisher’s exact p-value, two-sided)
Amount Asked
Null
Hypothesis

All
amounts

$3 & 6

$6 & 9

$9 & 12

Real =
Hypothetical

0.00

0.00

0.15

0.03

0.02

0.10

0.57

Real = Cheap
Talk

0.02

0.01

0.19

a

0.48

1.00

a

Hypothetical
= Cheap Talk

0.06

0.75

1.00

0.02

0.15

0.18

0.48

$12 & 15 $15 & 18

Bold denotes significant at 10% level.
a

There were not any “yes” responses in either treatment so test cannot be conducted.
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Table V
Mean Response to Follow-up Free-rider Questions a
Treatment
Question

Real

Cheap Talk

Hypothetical

2.38

2.56

2.21

(2.04)

(2.05)

(1.62)

0.08

0.07

0.11

(0.28)

(0.26)

(0.32)

5.69

6.37

5.93

(3.04)

(2.67)

(2.53)

0.20

0.30

0.18

(0.40)

(0.46)

(0.38)

1. “To what extent did the following
influence your decision about HOW
MUCH to contribute…Since others will
pay, I do not need to contribute as much.”
(1 = less influence, 10 = more influence)
2. “What factors did you consider when
deciding how much to contribute
TODAY?…What I thought others would
do.” (0 = did not consider this factor, 1 =
considered factor)
3. “Most other people will contribute less
than what (the good) is really worth to
them because they assume they will be
able to enjoy the benefits, regardless of
how much they contribute.”
(1 = disagree, 10 = agree)
4. “If you knew exactly how much everyone
else contributed, would that change your
contribution decision?” (0 = no, 1 = yes)
a

Standard deviation in parentheses.
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APPENDIX A - INSTRUCTIONS FOR REAL PAYMENT TREATMENT
The instructions for both the hypothetical payment and cheap talk treatments is the same, except
for minor wording changes to indicate that the payments are hypothetical. The text for the
hypothetical payment treatment is in <italics>.
The market experiment is now over.
Before you leave, we would like to ask you <a hypothetical question> about contributing to the
Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy, which is a non-profit organization that
protects land in order to preserve plants, animals, and natural communities in Massachusetts.
<Even though earnings or payment of money in this upcoming part are hypothetical, we ask that
you respond to questions as if they involved a real cash payment.>
ALL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE <WOULD BE> VOLUNTARY.
If you <were to> choose to contribute more than you have earned today, you will <would> be
expected to pay the difference in cash or check at the end of today's session.
If you <were to> choose not to contribute anything, your earnings from today are <would be>
yours to keep.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has one of the most diverse ranges of habitats among all
states in the U.S.
Massachusetts has the country's sixth largest state park system and the country's largest
concentration of land trusts operate here. The activities of the Nature Conservancy in
Massachusetts help to preserve these areas through acquisition of land so that these lands may be
kept in their natural state for years to come.
The Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy has preserved 14,000 acres, many
harboring rare species of plants and animals.
The Conservancy bases its land protection action on scientific studies and surveys. These studies
identify the rarest plants, animals and natural communities that are at risk.
In Massachusetts these types of areas have included parts of the Connecticut River Valley,
Martha's Vineyard, and the Southern Berkshires. By protecting these areas, threatened and
endangered species such as cooper's hawks, box turtles, spring salamanders, and the yellow
lady's slipper are provided safe habitat in which they may continue to live.
The Conservancy protects these types of natural areas by outright acquisition of the land, by
Conservation easement, and through registry programs that allow private landowners to preserve
their properties under the guidance of the Conservancy.
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Locally, the Nature Conservancy is currently purchasing land near the Mt. Toby State Forest,
which is about 10 minutes from campus.
The mixed oak-hemlock-sugar-maple forest of Mt. Toby and its wetlands are home to rare
salamanders, turtles, and many wildflowers, both rare and common, including the autumn
coralroot and the trout lily. Mt. Toby is also a refuge for wildlife such as ravens and wild
turkeys.
The area provides many types of outdoor activities including hiking, bird-watching, and crosscountry skiing. However trails and rare species are often not well marked, which can reduce the
enjoyment people get from visiting the park.
The Nature Conservancy needs donations to support its program to prevent development on Mt.
Toby and to mark trails so these lands may be preserved in their natural state for the use and
enjoyment of the public today and in the future.
Several groups of people are being asked to contribute to this program. If a total of $500 dollars
is raised, we will be able to place signs in and around Mt. Toby identifying the trails and rare
species.
However, if not enough money is raised to fund this program, everyone's contribution will be
refunded. If more than enough is raised, additional contributions can be provided to the
program.
<Suppose that we were to ask for actual cash payments today.
You would then be asked to check 'yes' or 'no' on whether or not you would contribute to the
Nature Conservancy.>
If enough money is <were> raised, the money will <would> be sent to the Nature Conservancy
and the receipt will be posted on the bulletin board outside of Stockbridge Hall Room 220.
<Although payment will be hypothetical, we ask that you respond as if this involved a real cash
payment.>
In a moment, you will be asked <a hypothetical question about> whether you wish to contribute
to Nature Conservancy here and now.
These voluntary contributions will <would> be deducted from your earnings today. If you <were
to> choose to contribute more than you earned, you will <would> be expected to pay the
difference in full at the end of today’s session.
Before you continue, if you have any questions raise your hand and someone will come to you.
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APPENDIX B - CHEAP TALK SCRIPT
Participants were given a printed copy of this script and were asked to read along as the
experimenter read the script aloud.
Before you make a decision about this, please open the stapled sheet of paper in your
participants’ packet. Please read along as I read the contents to you.
Before you make your decision, I want to talk to you about a problem that we have in studies like
this one. As I told you a minute ago, this is a hypothetical decision, not a real one. No one will
actually pay money at the end of the decision. But I also asked you to respond to the decision as
though the result of your vote would involve a real cash payment by you.
And that’s the problem.
In most studies of this kind, folks seem to have a hard time doing this. They act
differently in a hypothetical situation, where they don’t really have to pay money, than they do in
a real situation, where they really could have to pay money. For example, in a recent study,
several different groups of people made decisions just like this one you are about to make.
Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it will be for you. No one had to pay money in
this hypothetical situation. The results of these studies were that on average, across the groups,
38% of them decided to contribute. With another set of groups with similar people deciding on
the same situation as you will decide on here, but where the payment was real and people really
did have to pay money if they said yes, the results on average, across the groups were that 25%
decided to contribute. That’s quite a difference isn’t it?
We call this a ‘hypothetical bias.’ ‘Hypothetical bias’ is the difference that we
continually see in the way people respond to hypothetical situation as compared to real
situations, people seem to respond just like you see here on the overhead.
In the real situation, where people knew they would have to pay money if they decided to
contribute, 25% said ‘yes’ and 75% said ‘no.’ When payment was hypothetical and people knew
they would not pay anything if they decided to contribute, just like your decision today, 38% said
‘yes’ and 62% said ‘no.’
How can we get people to think about their decision in a hypothetical situation like they
think in a real situation? How do we get them to think about what it means to really dig into
their pocket and pay money, if in fact they really are not going to have to do it?
Let me tell you why I think that we continually see this hypothetical bias, why people
behave differently in a hypothetical situation than they do when the situation is real. I think that
when we hear about a situation that involves doing something that is basically good, for example
helping people in need, improving environmental quality, or anything else, our basic reaction in
a hypothetical situation is to think: sure, I would do this. I really would spend the money; I
really, really, think I would. What our “yes” vote really means in this case, is that we are
basically good people, and that we would like to see good things happen.
But when the situation is real, and we would actually have to spend our money, we think
a different way. We basically still would like to see good things happen, but when we are faced
with the possibility of having to spend money, we think about our options: If I spend money on
this, that’s money I don’t have to spend on other things. If I spend money to help conserve
natural areas in Massachusetts, that’s money I don’t have to spend on groceries, go to a movie, or
perhaps to give to some other environmental organization. So, when the payment is real, we act
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in a way that takes into account the limited amount of money we have. We decide realizing that
we just don’t have enough money to do everything we might like to do. This is just my opinion,
of course, but it’s what I think may be going on in the hypothetical situation.
In any case, the only way that we know to get people like you to decide in our
hypothetical situation just like you would if the situation was real is to simply ask you: In the
decision that we’re going to take in a few minutes please do the following:
Think about what you are deciding on. If this were real, if you said yes, you would
actually have to dig into your pocket and pay $____ right now, do you really want to fund the
conservation of natural lands in the state of Massachusetts enough that you would be willing to
spend the money?
If I were in your shoes, and I was asked to decide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on this proposition that
requires me to spend $___, I would think about how I feel about spending my money this way.
When I got ready to decide, I would ask myself: if this was a real situation, and I had to pay
$___, do I really want to spend my money this way. If I really did, I would say yes; if I didn’t, I
would say no. I wouldn’t throw my money around. That’ s just my opinion, of course. You
must do whatever you want to do.
In any case, I ask you to decide exactly as you would if you were really going to face the
consequences of your decision: which is to pay money if you say yes to contribute.
Please keep this in mind when deciding whether you would contribute to this program.
If you have any questions raise your hand and someone will come to you.
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